# The Evolving Concept of Crisis Management: *Kiki Kanri* and Local Government

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## 1. Expanding the Definition of Crisis

The modern concept of crisis management, or *kiki kanri*, first began to permeate Japanese society in 1962, in connection with US President John F. Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis.

Kennedy faced a huge dilemma at the time. If he allowed the Soviet Union to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba (a Soviet ally), it would alter the balance of power by putting the United States under the constant threat of nuclear attack. Yet if he followed the advice of his hawkish military advisors and ordered the bombing of the Cuban missile bases, he risked triggering a nuclear world war. Even if the United States triumphed in the end, its victory would only come after nuclear bombs had devastated multiple US cities, taken countless American lives, and exposed survivors to toxic levels of radiation for years to come.

Facing a national crisis, Kennedy took a gamble by instituting a blockade and announced that incoming Soviet ships would be boarded and inspected. It was clear that since no Soviet ship commander could allow such an inspection, any attempt to break the blockade would lead to local hostilities that could easily escalate to full-scale war—a war that would leave the Soviet Union in

ruins. Kennedy's announcement signaled that the United States would not shrink from nuclear war. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev interpreted this warning correctly and finally agreed to remove the missiles, thus resolving the crisis.

In Japan, the White House's handling of the situation was analyzed as an example of *kiki kanri*—a direct translation of the English "crisis management" and a term new to the majority of Japanese. Because of this early context, use of the term *kiki kanri* was at first limited to situations involving national crises and their handing by political leaders.

It was not until much later that *kiki kanri* came to be applied to the handling of emergencies stemming from natural disasters. In 1995, in the wake of the Great Hanshin (Kobe) Earthquake, the Japanese government came under harsh criticism not simply for its response to that particular situation but for its general ineptitude in the face of crises. After that term *kiki* (crisis) began to be used much more broadly, in reference to any event or situation—whether natural or human in origin—that threatened serious harm to society. Accordingly, *kiki kanri* encompassed the response of leaders or governing systems to any such event or situation.

The Great Hanshin Earthquake was a disaster of huge proportions, but it was not the sort of crisis that threatened the nation's survival. Because of this, and because of the central government's inadequate response, the disaster left behind it a new and lasting realization that local governments, businesses, and communities needed their own *kiki kanri* know-how, systems, and resources.

Of course, other national governments have experienced similar failures in recent years. The French government was faulted for its response to the 2003 heat wave that killed thousands, particularly elderly citizens living alone, and President George W. Bush was harshly criticized for the US government's

response to Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans in 2005. Like the Great Hanshin Earthquake, these were not national crises, strictly speaking, yet they called for a comparable response.

Be that as it may, it would appear that the scope of *kiki kanri* in Japan today is broader than the concept of crisis management in the United States and elsewhere, since it encompasses not only crisis management in a narrow sense but also emergency management and even, as we shall see, risk management. In the United States, crisis management, emergency management, and risk management are more or less distinct concepts. Major disasters are handled by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (not the "Crisis Management Agency"), but in Japanese that organ is frequently referred to as the Kiki Kanri Cho. Similarly, New York City's Office of Emergency Management is generally called the Kiki Kanri Kyoku in Japanese. To be sure, the US media sometimes used the term *crisis* in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, but generally speaking, the government response to such events is termed "emergency management" in American English, not "crisis management." The Japanese, however, commonly use the term *kiki kanri* in reference to Hurricane Katrina and the response of the federal government and other agencies. In short, the Japanese *kiki kanri* covers both crisis management and emergency management.

In China, a critical test of the government's ability to respond to emergencies came in the wake of the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008. According to the Chinese government, the magnitude 8.0 quake affected 46 million people and left some 88,000 dead or missing. Numerous school buildings collapsed, killing thousands of children. Landslides filled in portions of rivers, creating approximately 100 natural dams that threatened to break and bury vast areas in mud and rubble.

With the Beijing Olympics approaching that summer, the Chinese government viewed the situation as a national crisis threatening the survival of the government itself. It applied itself to recovery and rehabilitation using a system called *duikou zhiyuan*, or "partnership support," in which a province or major city was assigned to assist each of the hardest hit counties or county-level cities. (China's system of local government has four basic levels: provincial, prefectural, county, and municipal.) Beijing was assigned to Shifang, Shanghai to Dujiangjan, Jiangsu Province to Mianzhu, and so forth. The ratio of a supporting area's population to that of its partner had to be at least 99 to 1, and the supporting area was required to contribute at least 1% of its fiscal budget over a period of three years to support relief and rehabilitation measures formulated in consultation with the victims. Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, was not assigned a supporting partner—even though it sustained a great deal of damage, including more than 4,000 deaths—because it is a major city itself.

Shifang, a county-level city with a population of about 430,000 (less than half of which live in the city per se), had close to 6,000 casualties. Under the partnership support program, Beijing assisted with rehabilitation by building public housing; an expanded and improved municipal hospital; kindergartens; elementary, middle, and high schools; vocational training schools; and an industrial park. It also widened 68 kilometers of roadway, built 11 bridges, and reinforced river embankments. At one time several hundred Beijing municipal employees were living in Chengdu in order to supervise and support these projects.

The thinking behind this system is that relying on local civil servants is more efficient than mobilizing national agencies because local officials have a better understanding of the on-site challenges involved in the construction of housing, roads, and so forth. In fact, under the partnership support system,

reconstruction plans projected to take three years were completed in two. This sort of teamwork was an outgrowth of China's perception of the disaster as a national crisis and its decision to treat recovery and reconstruction as a nationwide undertaking.

In Japan's case, as we have seen, no real distinction exists between crisis management and emergency management. From 1995 on, a growing awareness of the key role of local government in emergencies was accompanied by the spread of the concept of *kiki kanri*, which for local governments was largely focused on disaster response. From that time on, local government units charged with disaster countermeasures (*saigai taisaku*) were typically renamed using the term *kiki kanri*, although the emphasis on disasters (*saigai*) remained much the same.

As defined in article 2, paragraph 1, of the 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (Saigai Taisaku Kihon Ho), *saigai* includes not only "extreme natural phenomena, such as windstorms, rainstorms, snowstorms, floods, storm surges, earthquakes, tsunami, and volcanic eruptions," but also disasters of human origin, such as "large fires or explosions." Moreover, under the same law, the definition could be expanded by cabinet order to include any other phenomenon "comparable to the foregoing in respect to the degree of harm caused." Under that provision, "massive releases of radioactivity" and "shipwrecks affecting a large number of people" were later included by cabinet order, and subsequent revisions have expanded the definition to cover all "other large-scale accidents." The breadth of this definition is reflected in the scope of *kiki kanri* in the context of local government.

## 2. Expanding the Concept of Management

In the foregoing we focused on the process by which the Japanese concept of

*kiki kanri* expanded along the *kiki* (crisis) axis, until it included both crisis management and emergency management. But the concept has also expanded along the *kanri* axis, until it now embraces not only the immediate response to an emergency situation but also prevention, recovery, and reconstruction. Recently published books on *kiki kanri* aimed at local administrators and business managers typically begin with sections on prevention, preparation, and response training and conclude with follow-up measures. *Kiki kanri* books that deal with disaster response by local agencies almost invariably include long-term recovery and reconstruction as well as short-term actions.

The broad application of *kiki kanri* mirrors the scope of Japan's Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. The focus of the law is *bosai*, which is often translated "disaster prevention" but is defined more broadly in article 2, paragraph 2, as "preventing disaster before it occurs, preventing the spread of damage in the event of a disaster, and recovering from disaster" (article 2, paragraph 2). In this way, *kiki kanri* not only expanded vertically, to include natural disasters and other emergencies under the heading of *kiki*, but also spread horizontally, to include prevention as well as relief and recovery under the rubric of *kanri*. In the English-speaking world, prevention generally comes under the heading of risk management, not crisis management or emergency management. But in Japan *kiki kanri* often embraces all three concepts.

In Spain, the Centre de Recerca en Governança del Risc (Research Center of Risk Governance, or GRISC) at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona receives funding from the business community to provide practicing professionals with opportunities for hands-on, real-world, graduate-level research and training in emergent risk in contemporary urban society. Topics of study include negotiating risk, risk of social exclusion, biohazard risk in the food industry and the environment, and risk in education. The center's basic

mission is similar in many ways to that of the recently established Graduate School of Governance Studies at Meiji University, but it distinguishes itself by a risk-oriented approach to the public-policy issues of urban society.

In an international context, the Japanese certainly need to be aware of the fact that *kiki kanri* may have a wider scope than its counterparts in English and other Western languages. But I believe the broad scope and application of *kiki kanri* has practical benefits. The rising awareness on the part of local governments and businesses of the need to study, draw up, practice, and continuously improve their plans and policies for dealing with any situation that could cause serious harm to society or the community is an extremely important and positive trend.

One practical reason underlying the expanding scope of *kiki kanri* is the fact that, while crises come in many forms, the basic elements of an effective response are fairly constant, and many of the lessons learned from one crisis are applicable to others. In that sense, the trend toward a more inclusive concept of *kiki kanri* attests to the growth and evolution of the field.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, discussions of crisis and emergency management in the United States focused on the need to integrate previously segregated functions. This emphasis came about as a reaction to the sectionalism that many blamed for the US federal government's failure to " connect the dots" and anticipate the 9/11 attacks despite numerous signs and warnings.

In the case of an industrial plant, for example, security measures typically focus on preventing trespassing, theft, or sabotage. But unless those measures are formulated as part of a total package that includes safety measures, the facility's safety weaknesses can become security gaps that terrorists or others can exploit. For this reason, recent trends call for coordinated safety and

security policies, as well as organizational integration of a company's safety and security units to ensure good communication. At a more basic level, the focus on integration leads to an emphasis on crisis management as an integral function of an organization's top management. Here, too, evolution has been accompanied by a shift from a narrower focus to broader one.

The extension of *kiki kanri* to risk management is also connected with the rise of business continuity planning. BCP is a form of organizational risk management that incorporates various safety mechanisms—backup facilities, data storage services, and so forth—to ensure that a business can keep operating under adverse conditions. When such concerns are incorporated, the subject of *kiki kanri* may extend even to ways of preparing for a business partner's collapse or paralysis.

As the foregoing indicates, the tendency in Japan has been toward an ever-broader interpretation of *kiki* as any situation posing a grave hazard to an organization, community, or society, and of *kiki kanri* as the prevention of, response to, and recovery from such situations. Given this trend, I believe we must continue to expand our interpretation of "crisis" when discussing *kiki kanri* in the context of local government.

I served as Tokyo vice-governor in charge of crisis management and chief of on-site disaster management headquarters during the emergency precipitated by the volcanic eruptions on Miyakejima in 2000. Since then, I have argued for widening the scope of crisis management theory to include crises of all types, on the practical grounds that the basics of an effective response are much the same, regardless of the nature of the crisis. I have customarily used tables 1 and 2 when making this case, but it would seem these charts are already becoming outdated.

With the foregoing in mind, let us examine some real-life cases that offer

Table 1. Types of Crisis (*Kiki*)

| Category | Examples |
|---|---|
| Natural disasters | Flooding, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions |
| Accidents | Explosions, power outages, transportation accidents |
| Incidents | Hostage taking, extortion, corruption |
| Epidemic | Outbreaks of virulent strains of influenza or other diseases |
| Terrorism | Bombings, kidnapping, other acts of violence |
| War | Civil war, foreign invasion, etc. |

Organizational response to emergency (fast communication, top-down decision making)

Table 2. Crisis Management Matrix

| | Experience | Prevention | Prediction | Preparation | Response | Evacuation | Recovery | Reconstruction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flood | | | | | | | | |
| Earthquake | | | | | | | | |
| Volcanic eruption | | | | | | | | |
| Accident | | | | | | | | |
| Incident | | | | | | | | |
| Epidemic | | | | | | | | |
| Terrorism | | | | | | | | |
| War | | | | | | | | |

local administrators instructive examples of crises and pertinent lessons for *kiki kanri* under this ever-expanding definition.

## 3. Expanding the Reach of *Kiki Kanri*: Recent Examples

### (1) Solitary Death

I have argued elsewhere that the challenge of building social capital in our cities is well within the capability of local administrators, providing they have the will to work toward a long-range vision of the city's future instead of focusing on the next election. Still, big cities around the world have struggled with social policy, and their track record is not encouraging. Whenever I see the staggering scale

of slum conditions and homelessness in US cities like Washington DC, New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles or in European cities like Paris and London, I invariably come away feeling that Tokyo comes off pretty well by comparison.

Given the relatively limited scale of Tokyo's poverty problems, the city could eliminate homelessness altogether if it chose to make the effort. We must begin by passing laws that force the government to provide permanent housing and employment (with emphasis on the "permanent") for the homeless instead of allowing them to congregate in public places like parks, streets, riverbanks, and shopping malls. (Some may protest that prohibiting the homeless from sleeping and loitering in such places is a violation of their rights, but I would argue that the real disregard to human rights consists in allowing homelessness to continue.) Now is the time to address this emerging crisis.

Another crisis facing all the world's major cities in the twenty-first century is the problem of isolation. In Tokyo the problem became brutally apparent during the long heat wave of 2010. In the course of one month, from July 17 to August 16, the 23 wards of Tokyo recorded 100 deaths from heat disorders. Among the victims, 90 percent were 65 or older, 70 percent lived alone, and 96 percent died inside their homes. While all these people died from natural causes, there is little doubt that many could have been saved had their situation been discovered in time. This fact, together with the insult to human dignity that occurs when a body is discovered in an advanced state of decomposition, make solitary death a social problem. And underlying it is an even more fundamental urban problem, namely, the disintegration of the family and the community. Solitary death is but a manifestation of this basic problem facing big cities everywhere.

Instances of solitary death in Tokyo are on the rise in general, not just during heat waves. According to a study by the Tokyo Metropolitan

Government Medical Examiner's Office, in Tokyo's 23 wards the number of cases in which people living alone died in their homes in "unusual circumstances" soared from approximately 1,100 in 1987 to about 3,400 in 2006. Men accounted for two-thirds of these cases. In the case of women, discovery of the body took 6 days on average, while for men it took 12. Overall, men are more apt to be isolated from family and community than women.

In his 2002 book *Heat Wave*, Eric Klinenberg (currently a professor at New York University) provides a detailed analysis of the disastrous Chicago heat wave of 1995 that took the lives of more than 750 people. He concludes that the rates of solitary death were much higher in neighborhoods abandoned by business. It seems that in places where business has declined, family and community ties have deteriorated as well. According to Klinenberg, solitary deaths are relatively rare in the Latino, Jewish, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Japanese communities, probably because in the United States, these ethnic groups tend to maintain strong community and family ties. By contrast, the rate of solitary death among older African American men is relatively high.

In France, the heat wave that swept Europe in 2003 killed nearly 15,000 people, 2,300 in Paris alone. According to French government findings tt, the victims were preponderantly elderly people living alone in small apartments. Casualties from that year's heat wave were also an issue in Britain, whose Health Protection Agency deals with weather emergencies as well as everything from influenza to chemical attacks.

In reaction to these deaths, both France and Britain began issuing warnings whenever high temperatures were anticipated and urging people to drink plenty of water. In addition, French laws were amended to require hospitals and nursing homes to have air-conditioned rooms (previously considered unnecessary, as temperatures in most of France do not often rise very high).

This response by France and Britain reveals an approach to solitary death as a national crisis-management issue. If we approach it a big-city problem, however, it points us to the underlying cause, namely, isolation from family and community. Warnings and similar band-aid measures will not solve such a problem. We need to deal with solitary death as a symptom of deeper social problems.

### (2) Renovation of Aging Condominiums

According to Japanese government statistics, Japan had more than 5.6 million condominium units nationwide as of the end of 2009. More than 1 million of these were built prior to 1986, and therefore incorporate obsolete earthquake resistance standards.

The standards for earthquake resistance under Japan's Building Standards Law were revised in 1986 to require all buildings built subsequently to be capable of withstanding intensity-7 seismic tremors—up from intensity 6 under previous regulations. This means that structures built prior to that time are in danger of collapsing in an earthquake if the seismic intensity exceeds 6. Individual residents may prefer to risk their lives in old, substandard housing rather than deal with renovation, and viewed from a personal standpoint, that is a legitimate decision. But from a societal standpoint, such conditions cannot be allowed to persist because they endanger others. When a building collapses in an earthquake, it can not only injure and kill those inside and outside the building but also cut off escape routes and block access by emergency vehicles.

Recognizing the need to facilitate structural renovation of older apartment and condominium buildings, the government passed legislation for that purpose in 2002 (Manshon Tatekae Enkatsuka Ho). Unfortunately, renovation of substandard building has made almost no progress since then. This is not to say

that the legislation is meaningless, but it provides neither the legal authority nor the financial support needed to ensure that old apartments and condominiums are brought up to standard.

The legal problem is that the law does not deny individuals the standing to sue to block renovation of a building when the majority of residents favor it. This had led to several instances in which residents have moved into temporary quarters in anticipation of renovation, only to find the process held up for years while a few recalcitrant owners battle the decision in court. This sort of situation can seriously disrupt people's lives and finances, and the potential for such disruption makes residents all the more hesitant to embark on renovation.

Financing is the other major problem. In the case of buildings in desirable locations, such as city centers and areas close to commuter-train and subway stations, residents can use the sale of surplus units to cover part of the costs, but in less desirable neighborhoods, they must foot the entire bill if they want to renovate. If the building's residents lack financial resources or are too old to qualify for loans, construction cannot proceed even if everyone in the building is in favor of renovation.

Changes in urban planning regulations since a building was constructed may mean that the building no longer conforms to standards pertaining to lot size and floor area. In such cases, structural renovation may entail a reduction in total floor space, and huge additional expenses may be required to accommodate all the original residents in the newly renovated building.

For these reasons, the market mechanism alone cannot ensure that aging condominiums will be rebuilt. Government support is needed to promote renovation, especially in densely inhabited areas where substandard buildings could seriously undermine effective disaster prevention and response. When the market mechanism fails, it is the job of public housing policy to correct the

situation. Such a policy is needed now to ensure that aging condominiums are appropriately renovated.

The deterioration of housing can have serious social consequences, as we know from other major cities. In New York City, dilapidated public housing projects in Harlem, Queens, and Brooklyn have turned into hotbeds of poverty and crime. Once a housing development becomes a slum, it can take many years to turn the community around. This argues for aggressive public policies to prevent such a decline.

Brownsville in Brooklyn is famous for its housing projects. Altogether they comprise more than 30,000 units housing about 120,000 people. Whi While a few are low-rise, most are high-rise apartment buildings of 10 to 12 stories.

Brownsville was already regarded as a slum as early as 1910. The area was also known as a haven for socialists and other radicals through the mid-20th century. Much of the public housing developments built there around the middle of the century declined quickly, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, and the community became virtually synonymous with urban poverty and crime. Some even say that the image of American public housing complexes as drug-infested slums had its beginnings in Brownsville.

While I was visiting New York in February 2011, a subway I was riding was stopped in the middle of its route between uptown and midtown Manhattan, and all passengers were told to get out. Subway breakdowns are not that rare, so no one made a fuss. In the New York Times the next day, I read that the police had arrested a murderer on the train. The man had been on a killing spree, and all four of the murders had taken place in Brooklyn. Unfortunately, this is the kind of thing people tend to associate with Brooklyn and its public housing projects.

Today a major effort to revive Brownsville is under way thanks to an organization called Common Ground (formerly Common Ground Community),

created by housing and community development leader Rosanne Haggerty to build and operate permanent housing for the homeless. With the help of funds from the federal, state, and municipal governments as well private industry, the organization is trying to change the residential landscape of neighborhoods like Brownsville. One of the key goals is to create local jobs by building neighborhoods filled with greenery and shops, unlike the barren landscape in and around the projects. Haggerty first gained recognition in the 1990s, when Times Square was undergoing a renaissance, by leading the renovation of a local hotel to provide housing for the homeless and opening an ice cream shop in Times Square to provide employment for formerly homeless residents. Since then the organization she has founded has accomplished much on behalf of the homeless. In addition, Common Cause's Brownsville Partnership offers counseling and other support for residents in such matters as pregnancy, parenting, education, employment, housing, and welfare benefits. It also has initiatives to support community financing, graffiti clean-up, youth mentoring, good nutrition, and crime prevention. Even so, turning Brownsville around could take years.

### (3) Protecting Consumers from Globalization

There are many who look on the continuing globalization of our economy and society with a jaundiced eye, and some argue that we should be doing more to prevent it, given the damage it has done. The reality, however, is that globalization is only picking up momentum. Today, when capital, funds, labor, and information are able to flow freely across borders, businesses, factories, materials, and products all move about with more freedom than ever, providing greater opportunities for employment and success, as well as greater ease in obtaining the goods and services one wants. Above all, since culture and

civilization have always developed through interaction with other cultures and civilizations, globalization is dramatically accelerating the speed at which society evolves.

Trade liberalization and deregulation have allowed us to take part in the economic benefits of globalization, but it has also left us exposed to collateral damage. We have been told that our workers may have no choice but to yield some of the rights they have traditionally enjoyed if Japanese business is to survive international competition, but that the government can soften the impact of such competition by protecting the rights of consumers and investors. This is how it should work in theory, but the reality is another story altogether.

Worker protections have weakened dramatically in recent years. After regulations governing the use and treatment of non-regular employees from temporary staffing agencies were lifted for all but a few occupations, the percentage of non-regular workers rose sharply. Such workers are easily fired and can claim no unemployment compensation when they are, and largely as a result, poverty has emerged as a major problem in Tokyo. Policies to deal seriously with the problem on a fundamental level have been slow to take shape.

The problem of unemployment among temporary workers is fundamentally a labor-market issue. But instead of addressing the problem on that level, the national government has passed it on to local welfare departments. Unable to receive unemployment compensation, temporary employees have nowhere to go but public assistance. This imposes a heavy and unfair burden on local government.

To my mind this points to a failure of the labor-market mechanism in Japan. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government has done little to foster public awareness of this problem, let alone offer up policy solutions. It is time for Tokyo to take the initiative in developing policies to deal with these pressing poverty and labor

issues.

Unlike workers, investors now enjoy fairly rigorous protection. The new Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission has a staff of 360 employees charged with monitoring financial transactions on a day-to-day basis to detect insider trading and other irregularities and ensure fair trade in stock and other financial instruments in one of the world's key financial centers. Laws and regulations mandating disclosure of corporate data have grown stronger year by year.

Consumer protection is a somewhat mixed picture. Japan has enacted some general legislation, including the Consumer Contract Law, and has established the Consumer Affairs Agency. In fact, since former Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi implemented his structural reforms, there has been dramatic progress in the area of consumer law. (I discuss these changes in detail in the Winter 2010 issue of *Jichitai Homu Kenkyu* [Studies in Local Law].)

However, while the Consumer Contract Law grants consumer groups the right to file lawsuits on behalf of consumers, it has many shortcoming, particularly the absence of penalties for businesses that violate it. As a result, society is awash in problems caused by contracts that take advantage of consumers, and consumer centers are awash in complaints about them.

Prominent among the subject of consumer complaints are private nursing homes, which now care for approximately the same number as the special nursing homes covered by national nursing care insurance. Over and over one hears of people who paid a huge upfront fee only to find that they did not receive the services they were led to expect, or who moved out almost immediately but were unable to get a refund, or who had to be hospitalized at some point after moving in and found themselves obliged to pay both the nursing home and hospital fees. And complaints such as these are only growing more frequent.

As head of the Consumers Organization of Japan, accredited by the prime minister under the Consumer Contract Law, I do not believe these problems can be adequately addressed by a nonprofit organization like the COJ. Without a strong legal framework to support rigorous enforcement of regulations, the market will not function as it should. Given that the increase in private nursing homes is directly tied to the shortage of beds in such public facilities as special nursing homes, convalescent wards, and independent living facilities, it seems clear that there is an urgent need for market intervention by local government.

In short, while Japan has taken decisive steps to strengthen protections for investors in the face of globalization, consumer protection lags far behind, while protections for workers have grown weaker than ever. In issue after issue, Japan's business magazines feature extensive warnings against business scam and fraudulent schemes. Clearly the business community itself is alarmed by the vast amount of money that is flowing into fraudulent businesses instead of supporting the legitimate market.

Some four decades have passed since Japan's Local Autonomy Law made consumer affairs the responsibility of the prefectural and Metropolitan governments. It is time for those governments to recognize that consumer affairs are in a state of crisis and respond accordingly.

## 4. Urban Governance and Crisis Management

In the preceding, I have examined the increasingly broad scope of the *kiki kanri* (crisis management) concept in Japan and made the case that the application of that concept to problems not traditionally associated with crisis management can help illuminate the nature of those problems and enhance our response to them. It seems to me that this phenomenon has occurred because our accumulated experience and knowledge of emergency situations has allowed

the discipline of crisis management to evolve to the point where it can be profitably applied to local government administration and urban governance, and also because this approach helps administrators communicate with citizens more effectively regarding public issues and administrative efforts to formulate and implement policy measures to deal with them.

That being the case, instead of complaining about the excessively broad scope of *kiki kanri* as the term is used today, perhaps we should regard this change as a sign of social evolution and realize that by discussing issues of local administration ranging beyond the traditional, narrow concept of crisis management, we can also contribute to the field of crisis management in the narrow, traditional sense. It was out of this conviction that I decided to write the foregoing, knowing full well that I risked the criticism of traditionalists. Although this discussion may cover topics not traditionally included within the scope of crisis management, I hope it will be taken in the spirit in which it is offered, as a preliminary effort to reconcile the field of crisis management with the practical challenges of local government.